Software components are today the most promising approach to dealing with the complexity and uneven quality of software systems. The design-using-components paradigm has been extremely successful in almost every engineering field, with its benefits of rapid, routine, reliable system construction. The central dilemma of software design using components is that component developers cannot know how their components will be used and so cannot describe component properties for an unknown, arbitrary situation; but if the component customer (system designer) must determine relevant properties of each component before using it, component-based development loses much of its appeal. In technical terms, component behavior depends on the operational profile the component sees when in place in a larger system; in turn, that profile depends both on system usage and the internal structure of the system, neither of which can be known to the component developer.
Components in Engineering
In many engineering disciplines, the idea of aggregating standardized components to create a complex system has allowed the creation of better systems more easily. Components are listed in a handbook, which describes what a component does, and equally important, gives constraints that allow the system designer to decide if the component is 'good enough' for the application. For example, in analog electronic systems, these constraints concern the allowable voltages for the component and performance parameters such as bandwidth. Accurate, precise handbook descriptions of components are the basis for computer-aided design (CAD) techniques. CAD tools allow the system designer to experiment with components in the abstract and predict the properties that hypothetical systems would exhibit if built from those components.
Software Components?
Any subject of current research begins with a "terminology war" in which researchers try to thrash out what they will and will not include in the subject. Historically, "component" in software is a rough synonym for "module" or "unit" or "routine." It began by referring to source code in a programming language. Some of these terms have now acquired additional precision; for example, "module" may mean an abstract data type definition, or an object-oriented class. This adds fuel to the terminology conflagration, because it raises questions like: "What's the difference between an O-O class and a component?" Clemens Szyperski has cut through much of the difficulty by removing the focus from the code source. He defines a software component as executable, with a black-box interface that allows it to be deployed by those who did not develop it [38] .
In this paper we use a restricted form of Szyperski's definition, taking a component to be a executable program with pure-functional behavior. It's interface is represented by a single parameter value for input and a single value returned as output. The restricted interface is not a theoretical limitation, since any complex input or output quantities could in principle be coded into a single value. The restriction to pure-functional behavior is a very stringent one, which is discussed in detail in Section 9.4.
Software Component Properties
Software components promise efficient design of quality software systems. Most research in components is devoted to functional specification, design, reuse, and cataloging of the components themselves. The complementary issue of the way in which component properties combine to appear as system properties is also important, but has received less attention. Reliability is one important system property. There are no accepted standards for the reliability of software components, largely because there is no theoretical foundation on which to base standards. Developers of safety-critical systems, and the regulatory agencies responsible for them, currently use only subjective assessments of software quality. It would be of great value to replace these with hard reliability data. Other properties of software systems emerge from the corresponding properties of their components in the same way. For example, system run time is an accumulation of components' run times and system security properties arise from secure components.
Success of the component-construction paradigm in mechanical and electrical engineering has led to calls for its adoption in software design. But the system designer who today looks for a handbook describing software component properties will be disappointed. At best a component will be described by its interface syntax and an imprecise natural-language description of its functionality. There is seldom any attempt to describe usage parameters. Furthermore, there is no practical candidate theory for using component properties to estimate system properties. System design using components is today done by trial and error. Properties of the system must be measured after it is implemented and tested.
Without solid handbook information and a sound way to use it in predicting system properties, software components may be no bargain. To buy off-the-shelf software with unknown properties is only to trade the difficult task of assessing your own work for the more difficult task of assessing someone else's.
Fundamental Theory for Software
'Theory' is not well thought of in software development, particularly in software engineering. There are practical, pressing problems to be solved and basic understanding is not viewed as important. Practitioners say, "Just give me the answer and empirical justification that it works and I don't need to understand why." Perhaps that is true, although many engineers pride themselves on going beyond 'cookbook' solutions. But research cannot be successfully done without understanding. Difficult problems are almost never solved by blind trial and error; researchers must have some idea how they might get where they want to go.
In the model science of physics, basic understanding begins with a microscopic theory. The physicist imagines low-level details of how a phenomenon might occur, describes those details and works out how they explain the phenomenon. The kinetic theory of gases is a textbook example. By imagining the molecules of a gas in elastic collision, it is in principle possible to calculate how the observable properties of the gas arise. The theory isn't practical in the sense that anyone uses it to calculate macroscopic properties like gas pressure, but it is essential to understanding why engineering thermodynamics (the practical theory) works. Nor is the ideal gas theory correct. Attempts to validate it for real gases show that it works only under special circumstances and then only approximately. These limitations of the kinetic theory do not cause anyone to ignore its power as a wonderful mental framework for thinking about properties of gases. Similar remarks apply to Newtonian optics and mechanics and to early models of the atom, which are important steps in developing more complex and accurate explanations.
We would like to believe that progress in software-engineering research similarly begins with basic understanding. In the case of software components, their connection into systems should be captured in as much detail as possible and the way in which their properties combine should be studied at that level. It would be wonderful if the understanding gained in this way could be directly applied to practical systems construction. But the understanding itself is worth the effort.
The Software Profile Problem
The difficulty in calculating system properties from component properties can be illustrated by a simple example. Imagine two software components used in 'series.' The first component receives the system input, does its calculation, and invokes the second component, so its output is the second component's input. The second component does its calculation on input received from the first, and its output is the system output. Consider the performance property of this composite system. To use the paradigm that has been successful in other engineering disciplines, one wants to measure the run time of each component in isolation, say T 1 and T 2 , and then calculate the system run time
Assuming each component's run time is the same for all inputs, this calculation will be correct. However, the assumption is very unlikely to hold -usually, component run times vary with input. In principle, there is no difficulty. The run times are actually functions of the input, say represented by a single variable x. Then T (x) = T 1 (x) + T 2 (x ), where x is the output of the first component on its input x. Unfortunately, the functional values of T 1 , T 2 , and x are seldom available in practice. The approach from first principles is precisely that of proving and composing functional properties of programs, an approach that has proven impractical. For practical calculations, some kind of testing and empirical measurements of component properties are needed, along with a way to make system calculations from these measurements.
For this simple example, let each of the components have a division into 'slow' and 'fast' calculations, and hence for each component there are two kinds of inputs, which lead to these run times. The system run time will then depend on two things:
1. The distribution of system inputs over the input domain of the first component. For example, if all inputs lead to the 'slow' behavior of the first component, then the system will be slower.
2. The way in which the first component sends its outputs into the input domain of the second component. For example, if each first-component output happens to fall on a 'slow' input point of the second component, the system will be slower.
In the example, if it happens that only the 'slow' calculations of both components are used, then the system performance is the sum of the two 'slow' times. But of course things will not be so convenient in general.
The actual input distribution of the system must be taken into account. The usage of a system can be captured by its input profile: a distribution describing how likely it is that each input will occur. Given this distribution, it would be possible to see how many system inputs invoked 'slow' or 'fast' behavior in each component and make a detailed, accurate calculation of the composite behavior. In fact, this is precisely the idea that will be proposed in Section 4. But setting the system designer with such a task is not at all what we originally had in mind, nor is it comparable to what happens in other disciplines when components are combined. The component developer was supposed to do most of the work, leaving the system designer an easy calculation of system properties in terms of component ones. Is there not some kind of "average" behavior that can be obtained for the components, which will allow easy system calculations?
Unfortunately, there is no such royal road to calculating software system properties and this is precisely the difficulty of synthesizing system properties from component properties. The behavior depends on the way in which inputs propagate through the system and the component developer cannot know the distribution -it is a system property, not a component property. In the example, if there is (say) a 10:1 disparity between the 'slow' and 'fast' run times then the potential system behavior could lie at either extreme, or in between, depending on the system input profile. If the components are advertised at any 'average' run time, it can badly mislead a system designer 1 .
It seems inescapable that components must be described in some way that takes profiles into account and that system calculations must be made in enough detail to use profile information. The problem is actually worse than it appears, unfortunately. In the example, the first component's behavior is determined by the system input profile. But the second component's behavior depends on the system input profile and the behavior of the first component. Component developers cannot know the profile and cannot know which components will be used together -those are both system properties.
The situation illustrated by this example is pervasive in software components and systems. It occurs in performance calculations (as in the example), in reliability calculations, and in dealing with complex logical properties like security. The difference between software and most other engineering components is that software behavior is intrinsically varied over an input domain and hence difficult and complex to measure and standardize. It is no wonder that engineers from other fields have thrown up their hands at including software in systems engineering calculations 2 .
Section 4 will present a solution to the software profile problem. The calculations required are nontrivial, as the simple example above suggests. Fortunately, most of the difficulties can be smoothed away by the work of component developers and the system-design calculations can be almost completely automated.
Outline of a Subdomain Solution
The study of software testing provides a way to deal with problems of disparate and extensive input domains: divide and conquer. So-called 'subdomain testing' divides the input domain D into a manageable number of subsets (subdomains), often but not always disjoint, and treats each in isolation. Thus the primary practical method of system testing is functional (or black-box) testing, in which system functions are gleaned from the requirements document and each such function is tested separately on its subdomain. This subdomain is all the system inputs that should result in a particular function being performed. Similarly, structural-testing methods have subdomains defined by grouping those inputs that execute some particular program element. For example, a statement-testing subdomain for one statement comprises all those inputs that cause that statement to be executed.
Once a subdomain breakdown of the input space D has been chosen, subdomain testing proceeds by insisting that tests be selected in each subdomain. Hence all the functions, statements, etc., will necessarily be tried by such a test. There is a substantial literature on subdomain testing 3 , beginning with the work of Howden [19, 20] and continuing to this day [12] .
In software reliability engineering (SRE), subdomains are used in a way that is close to the present purpose. In SRE, functional subdomains are assigned empirical usage probabilities, thus defining a crude kind of usage profile for a system. John Musa has been a primary advocate of obtaining and using profiles in SRE [29] . For example, suppose a system has seven major functions that exhaust the input space D, and thus has functional subdomains S 1 , S 2 , ..., S 7 , where D = 7 i=1 S i . A vector <p 1 , p 2 , ..., p 7 > with 7 i=1 p i = 1 describes how the system will be used. The vector gives the probability p i that input will fall in S i ; that is, the probability is p i that the i th function will be used. This vector is often called the operational profile. It is an approximation to a probability distribution p (which could be called the 'true' input profile), p : D → [0, 1] assigning a usage probability to each input. The true input profile for a system is never available in practice; in fact, it may be difficult to obtain even the approximate vector [29] . In this paper, 'operational profile' will henceforth mean the finite vector approximation.
Leaving aside for the moment the difficult question of which subdomains are appropriate (see Section 8.1), the subdomain concept and a vector of software properties similar to the operational profile defined on subdomains can be used to attack the problem of calculating system properties from component measurements.
Going back to the example presented in Section 3, the appropriate subdomains for components with 'slow' and 'fast' behaviors are those inputs that cause each. For component 1, let the input domain D 1 be divided into D 1 = S 1 ∪ F 1 with inputs in S 1 yielding slow behavior, and inputs in F 1 yielding fast behavior. Similarly divide the second component's input domain D 2 = S 2 ∪ F 2 . Now given any system operational profile, the fraction of system inputs that will fall into S 1 and F 1 can be determined. Hence the behavior of component 1 in the system is known. In order to deal with component 2, four probabilities must be determined: q ss , the fraction of slow inputs in S 1 of component 1 that wind up (as component-1 output) in the slow subdomain S 2 of component 2, q sf , the fraction from S 1 that wind up in F 2 , and similarly q fs and q ff for what happens to the fast inputs to component 1. With these probabilities, the fraction of all inputs that pass through each combination of slow and fast subdomains can be determined, and hence the run time of the composite system for any given input, or an accurate average runtime for a given system operational profile, can also be determined. (For complete details of this calculation in the general case, including system structures other than series, see Sections 5 and 6 below.)
In summary, the component development paradigm described above is as follows:
1. The developers of the two components decide on appropriate subdomains for describing their components' behaviors. (These would be the 'fast' and 'slow' subdomains in the example.)
2. The component developers measure the run times on each subdomain.
3. The list of subdomains and measurements thereon constitutes the handbook entry for each component, which is provided to potential customers of the components, that is, systems designers.
4.
A systems designer now wishes to imagine two components placed in series and to calculate the system run time.
5. The systems designer begins with an operational profile for the composite system. Using this profile, the fraction of inputs that fall in each subdomain of component 1 can be calculated, and hence the contribution of component 1 to the system runtime.
6. (This is the crucial step.) By actually executing the first component on a set of distributed inputs, the systems designer determines how inputs in each subdomain of component 1 are carried into the input domain (and hence into the subdomain breakdown there) of component 2.
7. By properly weighting each combination of component behaviors the complete system behavior can be calculated from the handbook values for the components.
Details of Series System Calculation
This section presents a mathematical theory to support the prediction of system properties from component values, for independent components placed in series. The issue of independence will be discussed in Section 8.2. Other system control structures are covered in Section 6. It will emerge that analysis of the series configuration is the essential part of the theory; from it the behavior of other control structures can be obtained.
The theory applies to any precise execution property of software; that is, a property whose value may depend on the software input and which is mathematically well defined. Performance (run time) and reliability are such properties with numerical (real) values; more complex security properties can also be represented. (For a discussion of these applications of the theory, see Section 7.) In order to be concrete, the theory will be first presented as it applies to program run time.
Series Combination of Run Time Values
A program's run time over input space D is a function T on D. Intuitively, T (x) is the run time for the program when it executes on input x. For a component, the inputs are values of parameters passed to subroutine-like entities, and T (x) is the run time for the subroutine when it is called with parameter value x. For a stand-alone system, x may be an input supplied by a user and read by a system i-o command, following which an execution with a certain run time ensues.
Now if two components C 1 and C 2 have run time functions T 1 and T 2 , when they are placed in series so that the output of C 1 becomes the input to C 2 , then for the combination the run time T is
where x is the output of C 1 on input x.
Component Developer's Measurements
In principle, a component developer could use algorithmic analysis to derive the functional form of T from the component code, and thus provide full information for a system designer who wants to use this component. But in practice, it usually will be necessary to measure T by executing the component. By a combination of structural analysis and empirical investigation, suppose that the developer of a component C divides the input space of C into a finite number of subdomains S 1 , S 2 , ..., S n , and approximates T as a step function that has constant value t i on subdomain S i , so that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Figure 1 indicates the approximation 4 . The vector <t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n > = <t i > n i=1 will henceforth replace T as input domain x ... In obtaining the component subdomains and the run time estimates <t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n >, the component developer must use sampling to verify that indeed the step function approximates T . 5 
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System Designer's Calculations
Suppose that two components B and C are to be composed in a series system design with the output of B the input of C. Let the component subdomains be S B 1 , S B 2 , ..., S B n and S C 1 , S C 2 , ..., S C m respectively (usually n = m), and let their run time vectors be <t B 1 , t B 2 , ..., t B n > and <t C 1 , t C 2 , ..., t C m >. It is desired to calculate a run-time step function <t SS 1 , t SS 2 , ..., t SS n > for the system SS (defined on the subdomains of B, since they describe the input to S). Figure 2 shows the situation. The information shown in shadowed boxes in Figure 2 describes the run-time property of interest, given by developers for the components B and C, and calculated for the composite system SS.
Figure 2: A series-connected system of two components B's contribution to the system run time on subdomain S B i is t B i . The contribution of C is made up of a weighted combination of values that reach its subdomains. The fraction of inputs from S B i reaching S C j is:
where B(z) is the output of component B on input z, which is input for component C.
A system designer, having chosen B and C and decided on serial composition for SS, can estimate the fraction r ij in equation (1) and then obtain an estimate of the run time of the composed components using the run time approximations supplied by the component developers. Then for the run-time vector of SS, on an input in S B i :
Data provided by the component developers (subdomain definitions and the vectors of run time values
for the components), along with the ability to execute component B (to obtain values of B(z) in equation (1)), allows the system designer to make a brute-force calculation of run time for a compositional system SS using equation (2) . The calculation can be automated and supported by a design tool that allows the system designer to input component values and receive back the values of <t SS i > n i=1 . The expensive part of this calculation is sampling each S B i subdomain to estimate the r ij in equation (1).
Other System Control Structures
At the top level of a 'main' imperative program, any system can be built using the three elementary structured-programming constructions of sequence, conditional, and iteration. The standard software analysis paradigm is to:
• Obtain a general rule for analysis of each elementary construction in isolation, then
• Perform the system analysis piece by piece,. using the algebra of recursive construction for a given system.
In this way, the largest system is no more difficult to analyze than the simplest -it just takes more applications of the three elementary-construction rules. Section 5 gives the theory for sequences, which turns out to be the essence of the theory. The systemdesign constructions of conditional and iteration can be analyzed by turning them into special cases of sequences.
Conditional System Control Structure
The sequential construction of Section 5 can be applied to a conditional that appears following a component B:
The conditional test b partitions the input domain D into:
First consider B; C T , which can be analyzed using equation (1) with subdomains S C T j , but in calculating the set in the numerator of equation (1), count a point z only if b(B(z)) is true. This is equivalent to intersecting the subdomains of C T with D T . Similarly, treat B; C F with C F 's subdomains adjusted to include only the part of each where b is false. These two calculations determine the contribution from C T and C F to the run time. Equation (2) becomes:
Iterative System Control Structure
The remaining programming construction in the algebra of design is iteration. Iterative constructions are the bane of program analysis in general, because their behavior usually cannot be calculated in closed form. For this theory things are a little better than usual. Begin by unrolling the loop
The unrolled form could be handled as in Sections 5 and 6.1 were it not that its second part is the very loop to be analyzed. However, it could happen that b(C(z)) is false for all z considered in the sampling of the sequence construction, and in that case there is no contribution from the false terms in equation (3); that is, the residual loop construction does not contribute to the performance because the loop is exited after the first iteration. If we are not so fortunate, the loop can be unrolled a second time and perhaps now the residual loop disappears. If not, continue to unroll until the residual loop does disappear, say a total of k executions of the loop body. In practice, k may be too large; or, if too few samples are taken it may falsely appear that D T in equation (3) is empty. However, if the loop terminates, k always exists and if it is too large the performance of the system may be unacceptable so that the design is abandoned in any case.
One very common system design requires special consideration. Many systems are written as "one big loop" never intended to terminate and system processing is performed repeatedly within this loop. For such a program, k → ∞, and there is no meaningful value of most system properties. Typically the composition operator accumulates property values in such a way that a system property approaches some limiting value that is not of interest. For example, the run time of a system diverges to ∞; system reliability goes to zero. In this case the system designer is usually interested not in the system property including the loop, but rather the per-iteration value, and the theory will be used to make that calculation.
Applications of the Paradigm
This section describes a handful of applications of the theory presented in Sections 5 and 6. In subsequent sections a number of issues are considered that affect these applications, viz: choosing subdomains (Section 8.1), component independence (Section 8.2), proving components correct (Section 8.3), and validating experiments (Section 10).
Performance
The run time of systems constructed from components is the most straightforward application of the theory. For this case the issues of choosing subdomains and of component independence have the best resolution, the intuitive plausibility of the theory is greatest, and validating experiments are easiest to perform.
Run time was used in Sections 5 and 6 to present the theory and it will be the subject of the first validation experiments in Section 10.
Reliability
Reliability is the basic quality parameter for all engineering artifacts. The inability to factor an accurate reliability for software components into the safety analysis of embedded systems is today a serious problem for agencies like the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It was the reliability application that first suggested the subdomain solution [11] to the problem of input dependence.
For reliability, in the mathematical treatment the run-time combination operator "+" is replaced by multiplication of reliability probabilities, so equation (2) becomes:
where the <t i > vectors now represent reliability values rather than run times. Reference [15] presents a detailed discussion of the reliability application. Compared with run time, the reliability application is less satisfactory. The question of component independence is crucially important and difficult to resolve. Experiments are surprisingly difficult to perform.
In other applications, the issue of component failures is suppressed. For example, in calculating run time for a system, we assume that the components are computing correctly and that their run-time values are a given. But for reliability, failure is the basic property being investigated and when a component fails calculations of how it interacts with other components may be incorrect because of that very failure.
Furthermore, the theory of software reliability itself, on which the calculations are based in this application, is not well accepted. It is only recently that the argument: "Software is either correct or not; hence its reliability is either 1 or 0," has given way to an understanding that a statistical description based on profiles is useful. But the underlying assumptions of the statistical theory may not hold for software and it is difficult to evaluate the empirical evidence. When experiments are performed to validate reliability models, the data are always noisy, and when the curves of the model fit approximately, one wonders if this is only because they have enough parameters to fit any noisy data. Not much support can be claimed for the correctness of the underlying models.
Security and Safety
Testing for the purpose of validating security and safety properties may often be cast as a special case of testing for reliability. The class of failures is restricted to violations of the assertions defining security or safety, which simplifies the oracle problem for this kind of testing. Software security can be defined as the probability that a security assertion will be preserved. At the component level this probability can be estimated and a confidence assigned to the estimate when a collection of random tests have been run without violating the security assertion. The corresponding system-level probability can be calculated exactly as reliability is calculated in Section 7.2.
Sometimes security or safety properties only emerge at the system level, however. Neither of two components has the property, which is expected to emerge from their combination. In that case, the components must be thought of as computing intermediate 'security' values, with rules to determine the system properties from these intermediates.
Memory leaks are a good example of such a security property. A component or system is secure in this regard ("leak free") if it never gets memory that it does not later release. Components that are tested to be leak free (with some probability and confidence bound) induce similar probabilities that a system using them is leak free. However, if memory is obtained in one component and released in another, the leak-free property emerges only at the system level -it is not present at the component level. This case requires that testing a component in isolation measure as its memory-leak property the size and location of the net memory allocated, and that the systems calculation combine these allocations to show that the composite is leak free. It is evident that this calculation must take into account the variation in component behaviors across their input domains, as the theory does.
Researchers emphasize that any software failure is a potential breach of safety or security 6 . The point is well illustrated in this theory, because a failure unconnected with security in one component can influence security in a following component and hence the system, for example by incorrectly emphasizing a relatively insecure subdomain in the second component.
In the security application, a shift from proofs of security properties to more uncertain testing for those properties may seem inappropriate. After all, the reason to separate out security properties is their importance and the ability to deal with them using formal mathematical methods. However, the ability to test for such properties and to use a CAD tool to easily get approximate estimates of their system values in terms of component values has merit. First, testing provides a rough check on a proof. Everyone knows of supposedly water-tight proofs that failed in practice. Second, testing quickly catches gross mistakes that occur early in system design. Even if almost every system input violates security it can be difficult to discover this by proof methods. Testing methods will find such failures immediately.
Functional Behavior
In an extreme application of the theory, it can be used to make rough system calculations of functional behavior itself. Suppose that the function approximated in Figure 1 is not run time, but the component's output itself -that is, the figure is an approximation to the input-output graph. Then the theory can calculate system (step-) functional values from those of its components.
In the situation described in Section 5 for two series components B and C, the <t i > vectors are now functional values rather than run times. When the system input falls in subdomain S B i , component B produces output t B i , which falls (say) in subdomain S C k , hence the system output is:
There is no approximation in this version of equation (2); any error in the calculation comes only from approximating the component output values by discrete step functions, and most of that error occurs in the first component, which in reality may produce a range of outputs over S B i , leading to a potential set of outputs from C, each with a probability given by equation (1) 7 . System calculations for the functionalbehavior application have the advantage that they are more efficient than for other applications -the matrix of values r ij in equation (1) need not be computed. These very rough systems calculations -they amount to looking at most-likely, coarse behaviorcould be useful to the system designer for:
• checking the functional behavior of the system design. Even a handful of subdomains could be enough to expose a serious flaw early in system design.
• testing partial designs. Missing components can be represented by phony handbook values created manually. This is something like testing with routine stubs, but the 'stubs' can be adjusted to mimic the required behavior more or less closely. Tools that carry out the design calculations can do almost all of the work.
Theoretical Issues

Choosing the Right Subdomains
It is obvious that the accuracy of system calculations made from handbook data for components depends heavily on the subdomain breakdown chosen by the component designers. For example, if only a few subdomains are used, the properties measured for those subdomains will be averages over data that may have high variance, and the composition calculations using those averages can be inaccurate. In the extreme case of taking the entire input domain as a single subdomain, the theory reduces to combining single numbers that do not represent the components, as indicated in Section 3. The insight that led testing theorists to look at subdomains in the first place was that a subdomain should group together inputs that are in some sense "the same." If this is done for one of the applications in which a property is approximated by a step function, then the approximation is perfect 8 . For example, if the run time of a component within each subdomain S is the same for all points of S, the step function is the actual run-time function. Evidently, the design-from-components paradigm will work better if the handbook entry for a component uses subdomains on which the property of interest does not vary much. One collection of well known subdomains has the most promise: the path subdomains.
Path subdomains represent the strongest intuitive breakdown of a program's input domain. Two inputs are in the same path subdomain if for them the program takes precisely the same path. Dave Mason has noted that the intuition behind this idea should end a path at any statement in which a run-time error could occur [25] . With this addition, inputs in a path subdomain invariably execute exactly the same machine instructions in a fixed order, making them 'the same' in a strong way. Indeed, for the run-time property, the path subdomains are perfect: within one path domain, the run time is fixed by the instruction sequence executed. For the reliability property there are no perfect subdomains, but Mason [25] argues that sampling over path domains may remove some of the theoretical objections to the statistical reliability theory. Unfortunately, for programs using unbounded iteration there are a potential infinity of path subdomains. Mason suggests that this infinite collection can be ordered and a most-important selection made among its members.
In conventional system testing, the most used subdomain breakdown is into the functional subdomains derived from the program specification. These subdomains are the only sensible basis for so-called blackbox testing, but there is little justification for using them in a component theory. First of all, they represent what a program should do, not what in fact it does do. Second, 'same function' is not a strong sameness, since the actual computations may vary greatly within it. The output values for points with the same function, for example, may be quite different, as may the run times.
Finally, there is a subdomain issue that cuts across all applications of the theory. The essential step in the proposed system-design paradigm is the measurement of the probabilities r ij in equation (1) in Section 5. These probabilities capture the way in which a component maps its input subdomains into the subdomains of a following component. The best subdomains for this mapping are ones in which the values computed by the component are uniformly distributed in following subdomains. Section 9.2 below describes the problem of 'spike' behavior that can result if values are instead concentrated. But the following subdomains are known only at system-design time, so the component developer cannot know which subdomains will prove least 'spiky. ' These difficulties suggest that in practice, component developers may choose subdomains that divide the input domain more or less arbitrarily, for example, by splitting a numerical interval into equal-sized subintervals. The finer such subdivisions are, the better for accuracy of the theory, but the more expensive it makes everything, since measurements must be made for each subdomain.
Component Independence
Since the component developer measures properties of a component in isolation, it is essential to this theory that the behavior of each component be independent of any others with which it may later be combined in a system. The most far-reaching consequence of this requirement is that components may not retain implicit state. Any internal state must be explicitly represented as part of the input domain, since that is precisely what it is. The problem of component state is further discussed in Section 9.4.
Questions of component independence are confused by using the subroutine-call mechanism of conventional languages to invoke subroutine-like components. Parnas [31] Mason and Woit [26] recognized this difficulty and suggested the solution.
The theory of composing component properties tries to confine variant behavior to each component by introducing measurements on its subdomains. Unfortunately, this does not quite work. In the theory, the behavior of the second component in a series composition is influenced by the way in which its subdomains receive inputs from the first component. If the first component is incorrect, and actually sends its outputs to the wrong subdomains of the second component, this will appear to influence the behavior of the latter and the system calculations will be wrong.
For any application except reliability, to avoid bringing in the large separate issue of component correctness, we assume that incorrect component behavior does not occur. The assumption is too strong, of course. For reliability, since failure is the property of interest, something must be done, as described in Section 9.3.
Exact Component Descriptions (Proofs)
Although analytical functional analysis of programs is in principle a solution to the problem of calculating any system property from component properties, the methods required are those of program proving, which have been found to be impractical. If a property T is to be calculated, and component developers have been able to derive and validate mathematical formulas for T as a function of the input, then calculation is a matter of combining the component functions into a system function with the composition operator. There is one substantial additional difficulty: any component that sees the output of a previous component requires a formula for the functional values (outputs) of the previous component, since its T values arise from those outputs as inputs. In the formula for serial composition of run times, for example,
it is not enough to know the functions T 1 and T 2 ; one must also derive the output x of component 1 as a function of its input x. Thus, in general, exact system calculations would require information equivalent to a correctness proof of each component [28] , as well as functional analysis of the property T .
However difficult this functional analysis may be, there will be cases in which it is worth performing. The best one can hope for is that in a system of many components, a few may have been analyzed mathematically; most components will have to be measured and combined using testing methods. Fortunately, it is possible to combine the two kinds of analysis. The situation is:
Let B and C be two components whose reliability is defined by testing measurements. Suppose that B is followed by a sequence of proved-correct components, which without loss of generality we take to be one correct component V . V is in turn followed by C. That is, the component sequence is B; V ; C.
The details of analyzing this sequence depend on the system property of interest:
Reliability. To describe a component that has been proved correct requires no subdomains or transfer matrix; its reliability function is a constant 1.0. So long as only correct components are used in a system design, there is no need for calculation -the system reliability is 1.0. However, when correct components are used in conjunction with others whose reliability is measured by testing on subdomains, the correct components transform profiles, and the system designer must find these transformations to calculate how subsequent components will behave. Equation (4) can be used for a mixture of tested and proved-correct components as follows:
The composition construction described in Section 7.2 can be applied directly from B to C by replacing B(z) in equation (4) with V (B(z)). That is, the correct component can be treated as if it simply extends the functionality of B. (2), the run times from component B (subdomain S B i ) and component C (m subdomains S C j ) will be included. Here again component V is just extending the functionality of B. It remains only to add the run-time contribution of component V itself. V 's run time is assumed to be a known function T V of its input. The contribution to equation (2) is T V (B(z i )) , where z i is any input in S B i . In a more complicated case the functional behavior of component V might have been established, but its run-time behavior might have to be measured by testing. Equation (2) can be also adjusted for this case and for the symmetric one in which the run-time function is known but the functional behavior must be measured by testing. Although correctness proofs are not generally accepted as a practical method of software analysis, for the serious component developer this position may need rethinking. The restricted size of components and the existence of good specifications may make proof an attractive alternative to testing. Two additional techniques can replace proof in some situations:
Run time. If B(z) is replaced by V (B(z)) in equation
Exhaustive testing. A component with a finite input domain can be exhaustively tested so that its functionaland run-time behavior is determined exactly and its reliability is 1.0; Knight [21] has suggested that this kind of design is possible more often than one might think.
Self-checking. Manuel Blum [3] and Ammann and Knight [1] have independently suggested that some programs can be made to perform random redundancy checks at run time, which are sufficient to estimate a component reliability independent of profile. Although the reliability of such a component is not 1.0, it is profile independent. There seems to be no evident application of this technique to properties other than reliability.
9 Deficiencies of the Theory
Problems of Scale
Microscopic theories like this one, which give in detail an underlying model of complex behavior, best apply to components whose size corresponds to the software 'units' of 'unit testing'; that is, components roughly the size of library subroutines for a programming language like C++. The restriction arises because the component developer must measure the property of interest, and this requires the component to have a manageable set of subdomains (on the order of 100) and the use of a feasible amount of test data for each subdomain (on the order of 10 4 test points). The number of components that practically may be synthesized using the theory is also on the order of 100, because beyond that the brute-force system calculations that require sampling from subdomains become intractable. These limits make it out of the question to use this theory on (say) a commercial word processor or operating system as a component or as a system built from components. The limitation is not surprising, since the very nature of aggregate systems changes with scale. An object-oriented library class may have a handful of methods, involve a few hundred lines of code and have a precisely defined interface. An operating system has very different parameters. This natural phenomenon of 'emergent system behaviors' is well known in many sciences and is discussed in reference [13] .
'Spikes' in Intermediate Profiles
When component-composition computations are carried out, even for simple examples like the one in Section 3, the accuracy of the theory depends critically on the functional behavior 9 of the first component in a composition. If that first function spreads its outputs relatively evenly across input subdomains of the second, following component, then the tests done by the developer of the latter are valid, because the developer tested using a uniform profile on those subdomains. However, if the first component in the composition produces an output profile with a 'spike' in any following subdomain, then the developer's testing of the second component is called into question 10 . As an extreme example, if a component computing the constant function with value K (its output is K for any input) is first in a composition, then the subdomain S K of the following component in which K falls has a spike at K. Any sampling procedure will assign 100% of the first-component outputs to subdomain S K as it should, but this obscures the fact that uniformly sampling of S K by the developer of the second component may be wildly inaccurate. Here are two special cases:
Reliability. If the second component is correct for input K then the composed failure rate should be 0; or, if it fails on input K, the composed failure rate should be 1. But the uniform sampling of S K by the second-component developer is unlikely to have tried K at all, or if it has, the failure or success there is diluted by many other points tried in S K .
Run time.
If the second component treats K as a special case and runs very quickly there, while over most of the rest of S K it is slow, the component developer's run-time measurement for S K will be 'slow,' while in this particular system it should have been 'fast.'
Although uniform sampling within each subdomain seems the wrong thing to do in testing a component that may receive a profile spike, it is the only possibility. The component developer cannot know if a prior component will deliver a spike, nor if it does, where the spike will fall. The uniform test profile is the best available. What the developer can do is to shrink the size of the subdomains whose properties are measured and to avoid subdomains on which the functional outputs have a narrow distribution.
Incorrect Components
As noted in Section 8.2, valid system analysis depends on the first component in a series connection being functionally correct, so that it does not induce a misleading distribution of outputs over the subdomains of the following component. It is not unreasonable to assume correct component behavior in most cases. The system developer must trust the handbook values that describe components to be used; it seems not too much more to trust the component output values. The primary argument for making this assumption is that without it, the separation of concerns is lost: rather than being able to treat non-functional properties in isolation, the whole question of functional correctness is reintroduced. The system designer can also make rough determinations of a component's correctness by treating functional correctness as a property to be calculated at the system level, as described in Section 7.4.
For the reliability application it is not sensible to assume correctness of components, because failure properties are the very ones of interest. This may represent only a weaker intuitive understanding of probabilistic properties (as opposed to ones like run time). However, it should be possible to study the incorrect profiles that result from erroneous component outputs, and to either estimate the error introduced in the theory, or discover ways to force the error in the direction of safety -calculating reliabilities that are worst-case values. Peter Bishop has done pioneering work [2] to model what happens to reliability estimates when the profile changes.
The Problem of State
Object-oriented encapsulation is often taken as the basis for software component technology. A more general view allows a component to be any piece of software that has a black-box description and can be separately deployed [38] . In either case, persistent state is a necessary feature of useful components. The theory presented here assumes pure-functional component behavior and is thus out of step with practice.
In a way, the mismatch is not surprising, because testing itself is often at odds with information hiding and encapsulation. The very features that make for good modular design make it more difficult to test an implementation of that design. However, 'testability' of components is easily achieved by (temporarily) exposing internal state, while that trick will not work for our theory. John Musa, in his arguments for the practicality of software reliability engineering [30] , handles internal state by making its variables into 'hidden inputs.' He adds these variables to the input space and subjects them to the same random sampling used on the explicit inputs. The flaw in this procedure is that state variables are not independent of the other inputs -their values are created by the software itself. Any independent sampling procedure necessarily fails to emulate the behavior of real internal state.
A proper test treatment of a component in which persistent state is important is inherently sequences of inputs, not single test points. The actual inputs are sampled in the sequence, but state variables assume the values given them by the software. The theory presented here can be used to sample sequence behavior, but there is a combinatoric explosion in the number of test executions that must be tried. It would not be so bad if only component developers had to accept the burden of a testing explosion, since their work is done once for a given component and they have reason to do it well. But if system analysis as envisaged here in a CAD tool must employ test sequences, it will be too expensive to experiment with system configurations and component choices. Intuitively, the difficulties with state manifest themselves in capturing the functional behavior of a component, not so much in capturing its extra-functional properties.
Lacking a better way to handle state, here is advice for designing with components to minimize its problems:
• Don't use any system-wide global state.
• Select components with state early and try not to change them in the design process.
• Distinguish components that store state from those that only use it; use as few storing components as possible.
• Consider state-rich components as candidates for formal analysis rather than testing.
Preliminary Validation Experiments
The simplest validation experiment for this theory works like this: step 1. Each component is tested in isolation on each of its subdomains. This yields a measured vector of properties, one value for each subdomain.
step 2. The components are imagined as a system, say in series, and the system property values are calculated for each subdomain of the first component using equation (2) and the measurements of step 1.
step 3. The calculation of step 2. requires executing the first component on test data to measure the r ij matrix of equation (1). step 4. Measurements are made on the actual system formed from the components, for each subdomain of the first component. 
Validating Fundamental Theory
The purpose of a fundamental theory is primarily understanding. It seeks to describe, with just enough detail to capture a complicated phenomenon, what is 'really' taking place. What does it mean to 'validate' such a theory? Or put another way, as Karl Popper would insist to satisfy his definition of 'science' [32] , how could a fundamental theory be falsified, shown to be invalid?
The answer lies in the necessary simplifications and assumptions made in any theory, simplifications that are essential to its explanatory power. For our theory, to the extent that a component program does not behave as a step function on the subdomains chosen, the predictions will be wrong. It is expected that as subdomains grow smaller and test-sampling densities increase, the accuracy will improve. In the limit of singleton subdomains, the theory should predict run times perfectly, since it is literally calculating the exact system property from complete data. However, that a theory should be correct, or should behave in a certain way ignores the possibility of human error. Experimental validation of basic theory then has two purposes:
1. To check the theory's mathematics. Everything should work perfectly in appropriate limiting cases.
But there can be a mistake in the mathematics, some important aspect of the situation improperly captured, that makes the theory fail. It is an important role of initial validation to expose such mistakes so that they can be corrected.
2. To investigate the theory's assumptions quantitatively. Even if the theory works as it should in limiting cases, it will fail if its assumptions do not hold in "average" cases. Learning how these failures manifest themselves and how the assumptions can be quantified, moves toward a more practical theory that may better apply to unvarnished reality, or suggests another theory that better applies.
It is possible to also conduct less disciplined validation experiments. There is no reason to believe that the theory should work at all in situations that drastically violate its assumptions. For example, if components depend heavily on internal state, the theory cannot be expected to apply to them. Nevertheless, experiments could be conducted on arbitrary components and it might happen that for unknown reasons the errors are not so bad. Such 'scattergun' experiments do not seem to us productive or appropriate in the beginning. Rather, if we want to capture additional properties, we first need a theory that attempts to do so, which can then be tested in turn.
The more "real" the experimental components are, the better they can be at exposing unexpected flaws in the theory. But there is also a role for using completely "unreal" examples. There is an exact analogy in selecting test cases for a software system. On the one hand, representative, 'real' cases are important and the most useful. But they miss many aspects that must be tested, and so they must be supplemented with contrived test cases designed to cover unusual situations, 'error' inputs, etc.
First Manual Experiments
Using the code of two simple Java methods as components, experiments were performed by hand for runtime and reliability properties with a variety of simple subdomains and different size random test sets. The number of tests (thousands) and the number of subdomains (a handful) required to get about 1% accuracy in the calculations are reasonable justification for continuing to explore the theory.
An unexpected difficulty appeared in the reliability experiments: simple components do not fail naturally, so it was necessary to create artificial failures. There is no clearly acceptable way to seed failures, which adds a further uncertainly to these experiments. Run-time experiments do not have any similar difficulty.
It was apparent that there are so many variables that influence the outcome of composition experiments and the bookkeeping required to perform each experiment is so cumbersome, that some automation is essential. Furthermore, since the run-time property has so many advantages over reliability, we decided to begin with it.
Systematic Sampling and Subdomain Experiments
A research-prototype tool to automate run-time experiments was implemented as a Perl script. This tool is the bare bones of a CAD tool for system design. Two Java components whose run times varied widely across their input domains were used. Subdomains were taken to be contiguous intervals in the input domains. Preliminary run-time experiments [14] using a pair of components with run times and output values increasing roughly linearly in the size of the input show that:
1. The r ij matrix of equation (1) can be estimated with sparse sampling, making the system calculations efficient in comparison with actually assembling the system and measuring its properties. It was only necessary to sample roughly one point in 50 to get transfer matrix elements accurate to about 4% from equation (1). 2. Even subdomains chosen without regard for the detailed behavior of components can be used to capture their properties well enough to make accurate system calculations. Subdomain choice for a second component in a series configuration is more important than the choices for the first component. To get better than 5% agreement between calculations of the theory and system measurements required only five subdomains for each component, sampled at about one point in 20.
3. The accuracy of predicted system run times was not much affected by the use of quite inaccurate transfer-matrix elements.
Components Constructed to Order
Performing run-time experiments gives an experimenter plenty of time to think while waiting for the system under test to do whatever it does. After the initial work reported above was complete, we wanted to try other component examples, with more complex run-time and functional-value behaviors. Rather than trying to create components that solve 'real' problems yet have interesting behavior, as we had done previously, we hit upon the idea of creating 'phony' components to order. A generator script was written that constructs a tailored component from a data file containing a finite collection of input-output pairs and another of input-runtime pairs. The generator script compiles a C program that stores these pairs in tables and does linear interpolation between table entries. When the program executes, it looks up the input it receives in the tables and reports its 'run time' and output value. This trick eliminates random fluctuations in run times caused by operating system timing and speeds up measurements greatly.
Our tools continue to be able to measure actual run times of arbitrary components. For the literalminded, the components we construct can be instructed to actually waste the run time in their specifications and then measure that they did so.
Related Work
Software components have promise for making a substantial improvement in the productivity of software developers and for shortening the time to market of software products. Most of the research needed to realize this promise is properly concerned with the mechanics of creating, combining, and deploying components themselves.
Software components also offer an opportunity to attack the problem of software quality by divide and conquer. Components are less complex than systems, so if system properties can be inferred from component properties it may be possible to transfer attention to components, which should be easier to analyze than a composite system. Approaches to to this 'compositional' aspect of component-based systems are the ones we survey here.
Proof-based and Analytical Theories
In principle, excellent explanatory theories of component behavior have been available beginning in the late 1960s, in the work of Hoare [17, 18] , Goguen [8, 9] , Mills [28, 7] , and many others. In these theories a component is described mathematically, by a collection of logical assertions, or by an algebra, or functionally. The mathematical descriptions have a syntactic interface part and a semantic part completely describing behavior. Component properties such a run time are described by analytical equations in its input variables. The construction of component-based systems can then be described as follows:
Components can only be used together if their interfaces match, and this match may include semantic properties. For example, one component may require that a list delivered to it by another be sorted so that binary search can be applied to the list. Once components are properly 'matched,' the functions describing their input-output behavior and their non-functional properties can be mathematically composed to obtain the system properties.
These theories are elegant and they completely solve the problem of analyzing system behavior in terms of component behavior.
The most recent incarnation of the logic-based theories of behavior is based on Bertrand Meyer's 'design by contract.' A version specifically directed at components-based system design and the possible need to modify the pre-and post-conditions of contracts, is presented by Reussner and Schmidt [33, 34] .
Component Frameworks
The commercial and research component frameworks, of which Enterprise Java Beans [35] and the CORBA standard [4] are representative, are intended to make the construction of component-based systems faster and easier 12 . Frameworks today are little concerned with predicting or even measuring system properties. Even the fact that framework overhead varies widely over different implementations and platforms is not of much interest to framework proponents.
Frameworks could be an ideal mechanism for measurement of system and component properties, however. A framework invokes and monitors its components in much the same way as our experimental tools do, but as general-purpose middleware it is not so restricted.
Higher-level Models
Most of the practical work in composing component properties to yield system properties uses Markov-chain models and most of the work is concerned with the reliability property. A system is viewed as a collection of transition probabilities for invoking each component, and when invoked the component contributes its reliability value. Littlewood's seminal paper [24] appeared long before 'component' was a popular buzzword.
Cheung [5] was among the first to apply a straightforward Markov model to the reliability of component systems. Mason and Woit [26] obtained good results from decomposing the UNIX 'grep' utility into elements that resemble functional-programming units.
Markov models of component systems must deal with two issues. First, the transition probabilities for a given system must be determined. Second, the properties of a component must be those of the context in which the model invokes it. Both of these issues involve operational profiles in disguise, the first a profile for the composite system and the second the profile each component sees in place. The accuracy of the model depends on how well these profiles are taken into account.
Most models begin with a fixed system architecture. The transition probabilities can then be measured from expected-usage data for the system. Yacoub et al. [40] use UML-like use-case scenarios to obtain the model parameters. Krishnamurthy and Mathur [22] do not explicitly use a Markov model, but determine the path probabilities in a system by exercising it with a collection of tests. Singh et al. [36] and Kubal, May, and Hughes [23] use a Bayesian approach, beginning with guesses for the transition probabilities and refining these as system test cases are run. Gokhale et al. [10] use a simulation approach.
The approaches using Markov models are tied to the control flow of a program. The transition probabilities of the model come from the branches and paths a program takes in execution. But control flow is only half the story of a program's behavior. The other half is the data values that arise when the program takes a particular branch or path. The analogy to structural coverage in software testing is apt: although tests may cause each conditional, data-flow, path, etc., to be taken, they do nothing to exercise a representative variety of data used when the path, etc. is taken. To obtain more accurate Markov models, the states of the simple control-flow model must be split to account for varying transition probabilities, particularly in loop control. It is difficult to obtain plausible probabilities for the split-state transitions and there can be a state explosion.
None of these models pay much attention to the second issue above: using a proper reliability for each component. If a theory is to realize the promise of predicting system properties from component properties, the latter must be measured outside the system, in isolation. In most of the models cited, this is done with a fixed operational profile for each component. Thus component reliabilities are single numbers which are then assumed to be appropriate for use in any system in any position within the system. Some models [22] do a little better, measuring component reliabilities in place for the operational profile given to the system. With enough data and stable system behavior this can be defended, but in the limit it amounts to simply testing the composite system, without any independent component measurements. McGregor et al. [27] have tried to account for components behaving differently in different system contexts by assigning a few 'roles' to a component, measuring its reliability in each role with an appropriate profile and then assigning it one of these roles in a system.
For properties other than reliability, strong research communities exist without a 'components' emphasis. The work in performance analysis is usually analytical (with queueing theory as the mathematical basis) and concerned only with worst-case behavior to meet hard real-time constraints. Papers are just beginning to appear from within the components community [37, 13] .
Memory utilization is an example of a safety property, which is more complex than either reliability or run-time. A system without memory leaks is seldom constructed from components without leaks; rather, some components get memory while others release it. An initial approach to the problem is presented by de Jonge et al. [6] .
Most of the work cited in this section falls in two categories:
1. Mathematical, analytical methods are in principle entirely correct, but difficult to apply in practice, where testing and measurement are the analysis methods of choice.
2. High-level modeling of component-based systems is meant to apply to real systems. The model is chosen to work in practice, not to aid understanding.
In contrast, the approach taken here is based on testing measurements and the model is chosen to capture as much detail of the component-based system as possible, for the purpose of explaining and understanding what takes place. A striking feature of our theory is that it applies to the composition problem for almost any property of components and systems. Other approaches use particular models and techniques peculiar to run time, reliability, etc., but our theory is essentially the same for them all.
Component-based Software Engineering Workshops
Beginning in 1997, a community interested in component-based software engineering (CBSE) has held a workshop in conjunction with the International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE). Beginning with the fourth workshop in 2000, one concern of the community has been the so-called "compositional" aspect of systems built from components. The workshop proceedings were distributed only to participants, but the papers can be found on the web [39].
Summary and Proposed Work
A detailed theory has been outlined that describes the calculation of system properties from component data, without constructing the system. The theory can be applied to any input-dependent system property and the system calculations can be supported by a CAD tool. Preliminary experiments support the theory.
In order to follow the paradigm suggested for component development and system design in Section 4, the component developer needs no new tool support. The testing required is conventional and in some cases special purpose tools are commercially available 13 . However, the system designer needs a great deal of support to carry out system-level calculations. It is proposed to develop prototype tools into a user-friendly CAD tool that will accept as input a system structure and a list of components and as output will provide system property values.
A more extensive validation effort is planned, in which a range of sample (constructed) components are used and the subdomains, profiles, and properties are varied to see the effect on the theoretical results. The application to other properties like security will be added to the run-time and reliability experiments. Section 9.3 describes the way in which incorrect component behavior causes the theory to give incorrect results. Theoretical study of this situation may permit 'safe' calculations of reliability or other failuredefined parameters, in which the results never predict better system properties than actually arise.
The results of validation experiments in the trivial examples of Section 10 were good, but we have no way of knowing just how good they should be to support the theory. What is needed is a detailed error analysis that assigns to each experiment a confidence interval to cover known deficiencies of the theory.
Finally, we must begin to investigate component internal state, seeking both theoretical understanding and practical experience with the difficulties it causes.
